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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the impacts of local-government-sponsored
pronatal policies on fertility by exploiting information on the geographical
variation in policies across municipalities in Japan. We develop an empir-
ical model that accommodates both the location and fertility choices of
households to take into account their self-selected migration across mu-
nicipalities. We estimate the structural parameters using cross-sectional
microdata on Japanese households in metropolitan areas. The results
suggest that self-selection may generate substantial upward bias in the
estimated impacts of pronatal policies on fertility. We also nd that, after
controlling for self-selection bias, some types of noncash benet prona-
tal policies signicantly increase the probability of births occurring in
metropolitan households, although the magnitudes dier signicantly by
revenue and birth parity.
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that fertility rates in many OECD countries have been
declining for decades. Figure 1 shows changes in total fertility rates over time
for several OECD countries. From 1970 to the mid-1980s, every country ex-
perienced a decline in its fertility rate. In some countries, such as France and
the United States, the fertility rate \rebounded" to the replacement rate (2.08).
However, other countries such as Korea and Japan experienced a steady decline.
In 2010, Korea and Japan had the lowest fertility rates among these countries.
Insert Figure 1
With fertility rates below replacement rates, OECD (2007) acknowledged
that policies that make it easier|or less costly|to have children have become
more important. In particular, given the experiences of rebounding to the re-
placement rate in the United States and Denmark from the mid-1980s and in
France from the mid-1990s, they claim that these \successes" reect the imple-
mentation of pronatal policies and arrangements that have made children more
\aordable".
There is a large body of empirical research on the eects of pronatal policies
on fertility in developed countries. As summarized by Gauthier (2007), most
recent studies based on microdata focus on the impacts on fertility of either
(i) cash benet policies (e.g., family and child allowances, tax reduction, and
tax credits) or (ii) noncash benet policies (e.g., subsidized services for children
and families, childcare provision, and maternity and parental leave). Generally,
studies of cash benet pronatal policies conclude that these policies have posi-
tive impacts on fertility, although the signicance and magnitudes of the impacts
vary greatly across household types and regions (e.g., to name a few, Milligan,
2005; Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov, 2007; Laroque and Salanie, 2008; Azmat
and Gonzalez, 2010; Gonzalez, 2011; Brewer, Ratclie and Smith, 2011). Con-
clusions about the eects of noncash benet pronatal policies are mixed (e.g.,
see Blau and Robins 1989, Del Boca 2002, and Andersson, Duvander and Hank
2004 for the eect of childcare; Ronsen 2004 and Lalive and Zweimuller 2009
for the eect of parental leave). Although these studies are well executed, they
tend to be restricted to particular types of pronatal policies and tend to ignore
others that are equally important. Because the magnitudes of some policy ef-
fects are not directly comparable with those of others across studies|policies
are implemented at dierent times and places| it is not clear which pronatal
policies are the most eective.
This paper contributes to the literature by quantifying rigorously the eects
of pronatal policies on fertility. Our study diers from previous studies in that
we estimate the impacts of various pronatal policies, including both cash benet
and noncash benet policies, at the same time. We compare the \eectiveness"
of dierent policies, and thus identify which policies have more impact on the
fertility levels of which groups of households. In other words, unlike authors of
previous empirical work, we evaluate the \price tags" of pronatal policies.
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Our identication strategy is based on the geographic variation of policies
across regions. In particular, we exploit information on the variation in prona-
tal policies across municipalities in Japan. Indeed, Japan can be considered a
suitable empirical testing ground, not only because of Japan's interest in the
fertility issue, which derives from its low fertility rate, but also because of the
large variation in policies across municipalities. In Japan, each local govern-
ment is allowed to supplement nationally implemented pronatal policies using
its own local budget. This policy implementation by local government generates
substantial variation across municipalities, even in geographically small areas.
This variation can be used to identify the eects on fertility of locally supported
pronatal policies.
Another, and equally important, contribution of this paper is that we explic-
itly control for the self-selected migration decisions of households when evaluat-
ing the impacts of policies. As expected, if households consider the childbearing
environment when deciding where to live, household residential locations are
not exogenous to their fertility decisions. Thus, ignoring such self-selection will
bias the estimated eects of pronatal policies on fertility. As does our study,
previous studies exploit regional variations in pronatal policies (e.g., Del Boca,
2002; Andersson, Duvander and Hank, 2004; Milligan, 2005). However, none
take into account the potentially endogenous migration decisions of households.
For example, Milligan (2005) estimates the impacts of policy on fertility based
on quasi-experimental data generated by the introduction of a cash benet pro-
gram in Quebec in the 1990s. He compares fertility levels in similar households in
Quebec and those in other regions of Canada during the policy implementation
period. Although selection into the program can be assumed to be exogenous
within the state of Quebec, the selection across states may be endogenous be-
cause of residents' self-selected location decisions. Thus, if households selected
themselves into (and out of) Quebec in the 1990s, the estimated impacts of the
cash benet program for the self-selected households might dier from those for
randomly selected households.
In this paper, we develop an empirical model that accommodates households'
migration and fertility decisions in order to control for self-selected migration.
The model is analogous to a multimarket model of mobility and earnings Roy
(1951). Unlike the original Roy model, we allow households to choose their res-
idential municipalities, and to determine whether to have children. Following
recent studies of residential location choice (e.g., Bayer, MacMillan and Rueben,
2005; Ferreira, 2010), we use a conditional logit model, which is analogous to the
standard empirical model of product dierentiation, to describe a household's
choice of residential municipality. Then, we propose a \fertility regression"
that relates a household's childbearing decision to various fertility-related fac-
tors, including household characteristics, as well as municipality attributes and
pronatal policies. We address the issue of self-selection bias by using a variant
methodology proposed by Dahl (2002). Following Dahl, we estimate the fertility
regression with a correction term for self-selected migration, which is a function
of the propensity for a household to choose its residential municipality.
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Our main data source is Japan's 2004 Family Income and Expenditure Sur-
vey (JFIES), conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal
Aairs and Communications (MIAC). The JFIES is a nationally representative
household survey of Japan that provides information on a variety of household
characteristics such as family structure, household income, and place of cur-
rent residence. We match data for households living in metropolitan areas with
data on the municipalities in which households are resident. For information
on municipality-sponsored pronatal policies, we use a survey report conducted
by the Cabinet Oce of Japan in 2004. Of the policies discussed in the sur-
vey, we focus on those that are directly related to fertility decisions: (1) Child
Allowance and Child Birth Allowance; (2) Medical Subsidy for Infants and Chil-
dren; (3) Health Checkup Services for Pregnant Women, Infants, and Children;
(4) Daycare Services Expenses; and (5) Community-based Childbearing Support.
We estimate the impact of these local-government-sponsored pronatal fertility
policies for metropolitan households in Japan.
The main results of this paper are as follows. First, there is evidence that
households select themselves into and out of municipalities based on pronatal
policies. Our estimation results suggest that such self-selection may substan-
tially bias upward the estimated fertility impacts of pronatal policies. Second,
after controlling for self-selection, it is found that Community-based Support
policies signicantly increase the probability of additional children in metropoli-
tan households with at least one child, in which the husband's annual income
is below three million yen. Moreover, for metropolitan households in which the
husband's annual income exceeds four million yen, there is evidence that Health
Checkup Services policies have a signicantly positive impact on the probability
of having a rst child. Although the impacts of these noncash benet policies
are signicantly positive, the magnitudes are small. Our estimation results sug-
gest that a 10 percent increase in Community-based Support policy expenditure
results in a 0:1 to 0:3 percent increase in the probability of having a rst child.
A 10 percent increase in Health Checkup Services policy expenditure raises the
probability of having an additional (to the rst) child by between 0:5 and 0:9
percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain
childrearing support policies in Japan. In Section 3, we develop the econometric
model and describe the estimation procedure. In Section 4, we explain the data
used for estimation. In Section 5, we report the estimation results. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Recent Childrearing Support Policies in Japan
In response to a steady decline in Japan's fertility rate, the Japanese government
has taken various policy measures to promote fertility. One of the main policies
is a cash benet|a child allowance granted universally according to the number
of dependent children in a family. This started in 1971 and was subsequently
expanded in incremental steps, with measures designed to widen eligibility being
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introduced in the 1990s. As of September 2004|the month in which our data
were collected|the rst and second children received 5,000 yen per month,
and the third and subsequent children received 10,000 yen per month, until
they reached nine years of age. Furthermore, the government implemented
various noncash benet policies in the mid-1990s to establish an environment in
which women could give birth without anxiety. Under two ve-year childrearing
support policy plans, the so-called \Angel Plan" (for 1995 to 1999), and the
\New Angel Plan" (for 2000 to 2004), the government implemented several
measures, including the enhancement of childcare leave benets, improvements
to the quality and quantity of day care services, and the provision of more
facilities for the care of infants and children.
Local government has also taken responsibility for implementing childrearing
support measures, in coordination with the central government ministries and
agencies concerned. Indeed, municipalities have introduced central-government-
sponsored pronatal policies as central{local government joint projects, with sub-
sidies (disbursements) being allocated from the central government. In the pro-
cess, each municipality has some discretion in augmenting projects by using its
own budget to meet residents' needs and demands. The leeway accorded lo-
cal governments has created regional disparities in childrearing support services
across municipalities. This disparity is used to identify the impacts of policy on
fertility.
The Local Government Childrearing Support Policies Survey, conducted by
the Cabinet Oce in 2004, summarizes local-government-sponsored pronatal
policies. They can be categorized into ve policy areas.
Child Allowance and Childbirth Allowance: Some municipalities oer a
child allowance and/or childbirth allowance, in addition to the nationally im-
plemented child allowance. The child allowance is paid for a given period of
time until the child reaches a certain age, whereas the childbirth allowance is
paid only at birth. According to the Cabinet Oce Survey, hardly any munic-
ipalities (3.5 percent) adopted the local-government-sponsored child allowance,
whereas about a quarter of municipalities (25.5 percent) adopted the childbirth
allowance. The Cabinet Oce Survey reports substantial cross-municipality
variation in the payment amounts and eligibility conditions of the child and
childbirth allowances.
Medical Subsidy for Infants and Children: In Japan, basic medical treat-
ment expenses are covered by public insurance. Under the scheme, patients gen-
erally pay 30 percent of all medical costs. The Cabinet Oce Survey reports
that almost all (97.5 percent) municipalities oered additional nancial support
to low-income households for medical expenses related to infants and children,
and for illness not covered by public insurance. Usually, to receive the medical
subsidy, households must meet income limit requirements and children must be
below a certain age. The income and age limit requirements vary greatly across
municipalities, as reported in the Cabinet Oce Survey.
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Health Checkup Services for Pregnant Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren: Under the Japanese insurance system, health checkups for pregnant
women, infants, and children are outside the scope of publicly insured medical
treatments. Hence, according to the Cabinet Oce Survey, most municipalities
(57.9 percent) subsidized health checkup expenses in an eort to raise fertility.
The subsidy allows many households to undergo medical examinations for preg-
nant women, infants, and children a dozen times for free. Although the costs of
free checkups are borne by the municipalities, the frequency and availability of
these free services are set independently by each municipality.
Daycare Services Expenses: In Japan, municipal governments are respon-
sible for admitting to day care centers children whose parents cannot care for
them when they are at work. Because municipalities operate public day care
centers directly and often subsidize private day care centers in their adminis-
trative regions, expenditure on day care services is considered a noncash benet
to households with children. The Cabinet Oce Survey reveals that, on aver-
age, the number of day care centers, including both public and private ones, is
6.8 per municipality, and the per-facility number of children is 89.8 for public
day care centers and 102.0 for private day care centers. Generally, municipal
day care centers are cheaper than private ones, but the former have relatively
limited capacity. Wide variations in childcare fees across municipalities reect
corresponding dierences in expenditure levels.
Community-based Childrearing Support: Municipalities have promoted
community-based activities in order to enhance comprehensive childrearing sup-
port measures. The Cabinet Oce Survey reports that 60.4 percent of munic-
ipalities used their local budgets to construct and/or operate special purpose
facilities, termed Local Community Centers for Childrearing Support (Chiki
Kosodate Shien Senta, in Japanese), which oer space and opportunities for par-
ents with infants and children to communicate with each other, and to provide
counseling courses and lectures by professionals and experts about childrearing
and home education. As of 2004, there were, on average, two such local com-
munity centers per municipality (primarily in urban areas), with substantial
variation across municipalities.
3 Baseline Model
Suppose that there are I households and J municipalities. We assume that the
fertility function of household i living in municipality j is given by the following
equation:
yij = xix + sjs + tjit + !ij ; (1)
where yij is the fertility outcome; i.e., whether household i living in munici-
pality j has children or not. We use xi, sj , and tj to denote household and
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municipality characteristics; xi is a vector of attributes of household i, and sj
and tj are vectors of amenity attributes and pronatal policies of municipality
j, respectively. Given the structural parameters of the fertility equation, x,
s, and it, we focus on the eects of pronatal policies on the fertility outcome,
namely it, which is assumed to be heterogeneous across households:
it = 0t +
KX
k=1
ktxki; (2)
where k indexes household characteristics. The parameter kt measures the
impact of pronatal policy tj on household i with characteristic xki.1 We let !ij
be an i.i.d. idiosyncratic random shock to the fertility outcome.
We consider a horizontal sorting model in which each household's residential
location is chosen to maximize utility. Following recent studies of households'
residential location decisions (e.g., Bayer, MacMillan and Rueben, 2005; Fer-
reira, 2010), we use a specication analogous to the standard dierentiated
product demand model proposed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). We
assume that each household chooses its residential municipality by taking chil-
drearing into consideration. In this setup, we consider each municipality as a
bundle of characteristics that provides utility to the households there. Thus,
residential locations are chosen from among municipalities. Let Vij be the utility
derived by household i from living in municipality j. Then we assume:
Vij = yyij + sjs + tjit   rjr + j + "ij ;
where rj is the residential land price, j denotes the unobserved local amenity
attributes of municipality j that are common to all households in that munic-
ipality, and "ij is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic taste shock. In this specication, the
residential land price, rj , serves as an exclusion restriction. We assume that it
aects a household's decision about which municipality to live in, but does not
directly aect its fertility decision (i.e., whether to have children).
Because the municipality-specic attributes, sj and tj , aect the location
utility both directly and indirectly through childbearing yij , we have the follow-
ing reduced-form indirect utility function:
Vij = sj(s + ys) + tj(it + y
i
t)  rjr + j + (y!ij + "ij)
= sjs + tjit   rjr + j + ij : (3)
The above expression incorporates the following reparameterization: s = s +
ys, it = 
i
t + y
i
t , r = r, and ij = y!ij + "ij . Note that the household-
specic characteristics, xi, which drop out of the equation because they do not
vary across municipalities, do not aect municipality choice.
1We do not include unobserved heterogeneity in this empirical model. Because our micro-
data provide a rich set of household characteristics, we consider the observed heterogeneity
sucient to capture household decisions on fertility and residential location exibly. See, e.g.,
Ferreira (2010) for a location choice model without unobserved heterogeneity.
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Because each household chooses the municipality that maximizes its indi-
rect utility, household i chooses to live in municipality j if and only if Vij =
max(Vi1;    ; ViJ). We assume that the random shock, ij , in Eq.(3), follows an
i.i.d.-type one extreme value distribution. Let pij be the propensity of house-
hold i to live in municipality j; i.e., pij = Prob(dij = 1jxi; sj ; tj ; rj ; j). This
generates the following conditional logit probability:
pij =
exp(sjs + tjit   rjr + j)P
k exp(sks + tk
i
t   rkr + k)
: (4)
The household's fertility outcome is aected by its self-selected municipality
choice. Indeed, a household's fertility outcome is not observed for all munic-
ipalities but only for the municipality in which the household chooses to live.
Let dij be an index that is unity if household i lives in municipality j, and zero
otherwise. Then, we have the following fertility equation for the observed yij :
yij = xix + sjs + tjit + E(!ij jdij = 1; xi; sj ; tj ; rj ; j) + ij ; (5)
where E(!ij j) represents the selection bias for household i, and ij is an i.i.d.
error term with zero mean conditional on the observable household-specic and
municipality-specic characteristics. Because of horizontal sorting behavior by
households, the selection bias term, E(!ij j), is not equal to zero, in general.
As noted by Dahl (2002), this term is a function of household probabilities of
residential choice across municipalities. Hence, we can rewrite Eq.(5) as follows:
yij = xix + sjs + tjit + E(!ij jpi1;    ; piJ) + ij : (6)
For estimation, we approximate the conditional expectation term, E(!ij jpi1;    ; piJ),
by using a exible polynomial function of estimated location choice propensities,
p^i1;    ; p^iJ .
4 Data
Our main data source is the 2004 JFIES, conducted by the Statistics Bureau of
the MIAC. The JFIES provides information on a variety of household charac-
teristics for about 9,000 randomly selected households in Japan, except institu-
tional households and one-person student households.
To sharpen the focus of the paper, we limit our sample to metropolitan
households with a husband and wife located in one of Japan's four major
metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka.2 In addition, given
that we are analyzing households' fertility decisions, we restrict our sample to
include only households with a wife of childbearing age, i.e., between 16 and
2Each major metropolitan area, dened by the MIAC, comprises a core government-decreed
city (e.g., the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, and Osaka
City for the Osaka Metropolitan Area) and the suburban cities surrounding it. The com-
bined population of the four major metropolitan areas represents 53 percent of Japan's total
population.
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50. Further, we include only households of more than three years' residence. In
doing so, we assume that only the childbearing decisions of such \long-term"
residential households are amenable to inuence by the pronatal policies of the
municipalities in which they currently reside.
We dene the fertility outcome according to whether the household gave
birth to at least one child between September 2001 and September 2004. Be-
cause of the cross-sectional nature of the JFIES, we can use its survey infor-
mation on household conguration to determine the fertility outcome for each
household. Information on other household characteristics relates to September
2004, when the interviews were conducted.
The data on household characteristics obtained from the JFIES are comple-
mented by information on the characteristics of municipalities.3 Information on
these municipality characteristics|including the price of residential land, the
crime rate, the unemployment rate, the rented housing proportion, the scal
soundness index, the number of medical doctors per person, the number of col-
lege graduates per person, and the number of supermarket stores per person|is
obtained from various sources. (Detailed descriptions and data sources are in
the Appendix.)
Information on pronatal policies is taken from the Local Government Chil-
drearing Support Policies Survey, conducted by the Cabinet Oce of Japan in
2004. In this survey, municipality representatives were asked a battery of ques-
tions about their pronatal policies. For the selected municipalities in the four
major metropolitan areas, response rates were as high as 73 percent.4 We focus
on ve major pronatal policies: (1) Child Allowance and Child Birth Allowance;
(2) Medical Subsidy for Infants and Children; (3) Health Checkup Services for
Pregnant Women, Infants, and Children; (4) Daycare Services Expenses; and
(5) Community-based Childbearing Support. These policy variables are measured
by expenditure amounts (in 10,000 yen) per child aged up to 15. We consider
only the expenditures nanced by municipalities' own funds; those transferred
from the central government are excluded.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the selected variables for the
selected sample. The top panel (Panel A) displays statistics on household-
specic characteristics, and the bottom panels (Panels B and C) report the
information on municipalities' pronatal policies used for estimation. Sampled
units dier between panels: Panel A reports information on 5; 697 households,
and Panels B and C report information on 277 municipalities; these gures
imply an average of 20 sampled households per municipality. Municipalities
dier greatly in terms of spending on pronatal policies. In descending order,
the major items of expenditure are on Daycare, Medical Subsidy, and Health
Checkups. The largest correlation coecient (0:43) is the one between Child
Allowance and Medical Subsidy. Generally, municipalities' pronatal policies are
not highly correlated with each other.
3In Japan, the four types of municipality (of government-decreed cities) are the city, town,
village, and ward.
4The survey response rate for all the municipalities, including those outside the four major
metropolitan areas, was about 60 percent.
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Insert Table 1
Spending on pronatal policies varies greatly across municipalities. Figure 2
plots quartile variations of per-child pronatal policy expenditures for munici-
palities in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.5 The gure reveals substantial varia-
tions in pronatal policy expenditures|even among proximate municipalities|
but suggests no systematic geographical patterns across municipalities.
Insert Figure 2
5 Empirical Results
We estimate the model in two stages. In the rst stage, we estimate the model
of household location choice, and in the second stage, we estimate the model of
household fertility decisions.
5.1 Municipality choice
We estimate the structural model of the household's location choice as outlined
in Section 3. Given the conditional logit model specication, the probability
of household i choosing location j is given by Eq.(4). We construct the likeli-
hood function based on the choice probability and maximize the likelihood with
respect to the structural parameters.
The location choice probability model includes the residential land price, rj ,
and a vector of local amenities, sj , and pronatal policies, tj , as independent vari-
ables. We assume that these characteristics are exogenous from the individual
household's perspective, after taking into account preferences over unobserved
location factors, j . Given that it represents the household-specic pronatal
policy eect on residential location choices, we interact the variable tj with two
household characteristics, xi|husband annual income and a dummy variable
for whether the household already has children|as indicated by Eq.(2). This
specication allows household tastes for dierent municipalities to vary with
household characteristics, and produces exible substitution patterns across mu-
nicipalities for each household.
There are potential endogeneity issues in the location choice model. Given
that land prices tend to be higher for municipalities with valuable unobserved
local amenities, the residential land price, rj , may be correlated with the unob-
served municipality-specic attributes, j . To deal with this endogeneity issue,
following recent empirical studies of consumer demand (e.g., Petrin and Train,
2010; Ferreira, 2010), we use a control function approach. The idea is to use
that part of the residential land price, rj , that is independent of indirect loca-
tion utility to proxy the unobserved municipality-specic attributes, j . Let zj
denote instrumental variables (IVs) that directly aect land prices, rj , but are
5The quartile-variation maps of the other metropolitan areas are available from the authors
on request.
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uncorrelated with the location utilities for households living in municipality j.
Hence, we have the following \hedonic" equation:
rj = sjs + tjt + zjz + j : (7)
Note that the unobserved j makes j and rj correlated with each other. In the
control function approach, a exible function for j is used to approximate the
unobserved municipality-specic attributes, j , included in the location choice
probability model.
For estimation, we run the hedonic regression, Eq.(7), and obtain the resid-
uals, ^j , for each municipality j. With () being a exible function of the
residual, we estimate the following conditional logit model:
pij =
exp(sjs + tjit   rjr + (^j))P
k exp(sks + tk
i
t   rkr + (^k))
: (8)
The household's estimated location choice propensities, fp^i1;    ; p^iJg, are, in
turn, used to construct the exible polynomial function of E(!ij jpi1;    ; piJ) in
the fertility regression, Eq.(6).
We instrument the endogenous residential land price of a specic munici-
pality by using the average pronatal policies of neighboring municipalities. Let
n(j) be the set of municipalities neighboring municipality j. We use the av-
erage pronatal policies of these neighboring municipalities as instruments for
the residential land price: zj = 1jn(j)j
P
j2n(j) tj . Using these IVs is reasonable
because of the way the housing market works: housing demand in municipality
j is aected by housing demand in neighboring municipalities, n(j). Thus, the
residential price, rj , is aected by policies pursued in neighboring municipali-
ties. On the other hand, because a household in municipality j benets only
from that municipality's policy, the household's location utility is unaected by
the pronatal policies of neighboring municipalities. This implies that the aver-
age policies of neighboring municipalities, zj , are correlated with the residential
land price, rj , but are uncorrelated with the preference shock, ij , of household
i living in municipality j.
Another issue in estimating the location choice model, given by Eq.(8), in-
volves the specication of the household's choice set. We assume that each
household compares the utility levels derived from living in dierent municipali-
ties, and chooses to live in the one that yields the highest residential utility. For
estimation, we assume that the set of possible alternatives comprises proximate
municipalities. To be specic, we consider municipalities within a 30 km radius
of the current resident municipality.6
Table 2 reports the estimation results from the household location choice
regression. Column 1 reports the estimated coecients from the model that
does not include the hedonic residual. In this specication, the land price is
assumed to be exogenous. Column 2 reports the estimated coecients of the
model that controls for potential endogeneity of the land price by including a
6On average, 30:7 municipalities are included in the alternative choice set.
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polynomial function of the hedonic residuals. In both specications, we ap-
proximate the function () by using a third- order polynomial of the hedonic
residuals. As shown, the coecients of the hedonic residuals used to control
for the endogeneity of land prices are statistically signicant. To test for the
endogeneity of the land price, we perform a Hausman-type test based on the
dierence between the estimates in columns 1 and 2. We nd that the null
hypothesis of an exogenous land price is rejected at the one percent signicance
level.7 Thus, in what follows, we assume that the land price is endogenous, and
predict the propensity to control for self-selected migration using the estimation
results given in column 2.
Insert Table 2
Overall, the estimated parameters have reasonable signs. Columns 1 and 2
show the robust nding that households tend to select themselves into munic-
ipalities with lower crime rates, lower unemployment, and higher rented hous-
ing proportions. Focusing on the municipality-sponsored pronatal policies that
may drive households' location decisions, we nd that households are more
likely to move into municipalities in which Community-based Support policy
is more prevalent. The estimated parameter on the interaction term between
pronatal policy and household characteristics indicates that location preferences
depend on whether households already have children: households with children
are signicantly more likely to locate in municipalities in which Health Checkup
Services policy is more prevalent than are those without children. This sug-
gests that household migration decisions across municipalities lead to dierent
estimated eects on fertility than those that would be observed if household
residential municipalities were randomly assigned. In what follows, we analyze
the eects of pronatal policies on households' fertility decisions more closely
after controlling for their self-selected migration decisions.
5.2 Fertility choice
Having estimated the household's location choice model in the rst stage, we
estimate the fertility decision model in the second stage. As discussed earlier,
the model of the household's fertility decision is given by Eq.(6). The dependent
variable, yij , is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one child was born
between 2001 and 2004 in household i in municipality j. The regression model
includes household characteristics, xi, as regressors; i.e., the wife's age, the
husband's age, the husband's annual income, a dummy for preexisting children,
and a dummy for whether the wife works. Also included are the municipality-
specic attributes, sj and tj , which are also included in the location choice
7The Hausman test of exogeneity is based on comparing an ecient consistent estimator
with an inecient consistent estimator. In our scenario, under the null hypothesis that the
land price is exogenous, the estimators used in columns 1 and 2 are both consistent, but the
former is more ecient than the latter. The Hausman test statistic is 8:08. Given that the
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is 2 with one degree of freedom under the null
hypothesis, the p-value is 0:004.
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model. In this specication, the parameter of interest is the eect of pronatal
policy on fertility, it. This parameter is allowed to vary with two household
characteristics: the husband's annual income and the dummy for preexisting
children.
In the fertility regression, we approximate the self-selection correction term
by using a function of household predicted propensities for residential locations.
Following Dahl (2002), we make the simplifying assumption that the correction
term can be suitably approximated by the household's rst-best location choice
propensity; i.e., the propensity that the household chooses the municipality
in which it currently resides.8 Thus, we consider the following single-index
correction term:
E(!ij jpi1;    ; piJ) = (p^ij); (9)
where p^ij is the predicted propensity that household i chooses municipality j
(in which it currently resides), which is obtained from the rst-stage estimation,
and () is a exible function of the location propensity.
There is one remaining estimation issue. The dummy variable indicating
whether the wife works is potentially endogenous in the fertility regression. Not
only is the wife's decision to have children aected by whether she works, her
decision to work is also aected by whether she has children. This would bias the
estimates by causing the wife's labor force participation dummy to be correlated
with the error term in the fertility regression.
To deal with this endogeneity issue, we use IV estimation. Our choice of
instruments exploits the \discontinuity" in household taxation that arises in
Japan because spousal deductions are subject to a threshold. In Japan, if a
spouse (usually the wife) has gross annual earnings of less than 1.03 million yen
(in 2004), the primary earner (usually the husband) is entitled to the spousal tax
deduction. As is widely argued in the literature (see, e.g., Akabayashi, 2006),
the tax deduction provides a working wife with a strong incentive to keep her
income below the spousal deduction eligibility threshold. At the same time,
because the spousal deduction reduces the primary earner's taxable income,
households in which the husband's income is relatively high can claim a larger
deduction when the wife' gross income is below the threshold.
Figure 3 illustrates the dierence in annual tax deductions between a house-
hold in which the wife earns less than the spousal deduction eligibility threshold
and one in which the wife earns more than the threshold, as a function of the
husband's gross annual income, denoted by s. The gure shows that the former
household can claim a bigger tax deduction than the latter household, and the
dierence in the deductible tax amount increases drastically (almost \discontin-
uously") at points where the husband's marginal tax rates change; i.e., around
annual incomes of s = 4:83 and s = 11:31 million yen. Because the reward
for not working is greater for a wife with a higher-income husband facing a
8This assumption, known as the index suciency assumption, implies that the choice
probability contains sucient information to describe the joint probability of the error term
in the selection and outcome equations.
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higher marginal tax rate, a wife whose husband earns just above the marginal
tax threshold has less of an incentive to work than does a wife whose husband
earns just below the marginal tax threshold, all else equal.
Insert Figure 3
This suggests using dummy variables indicating whether the husband's an-
nual income is above the marginal tax threshold as IVs for the wife's labor force
participation. Specically, we consider the following cut-o dummy variable
IVs:
1(si > 4:83) and 1(si > 11:31); (10)
where si is the husband's annual income for household i. These cut-o dummy
variables are expected to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of the
wife working. Because the alignment of the husband's annual income relative
to the cut-o values is unrelated to childbearing decisions, these cut-o dum-
mies are uncorrelated with the unobserved factors that aect household fertility
decisions.
We follow Das, Newey and Vella (2003), who proposed a control function
regression approach that takes into account both self-selection and endogenous
regressors. Like the usual IV estimation method, it involves a two-stage regres-
sion procedure. In the rst stage, given the cut-o dummy IVs, 1(si > 4:83)
and 1(si > 11:31), we run a \wife's labor force participation regression", with
the dependent variable being the wife's working dummy. Then, in the second
stage, we run the control-function-augmented fertility regression. In this stage,
we include the following \double-index" control function:
E(!ij jpi1;    ; piJ) = (p^ij ; ^ij): (11)
The function  is a exible function of the predicted propensity of a household
to choose a given municipality, p^ij , and the residual from the wife's labor force
participation regression, ^ij . Although there are nonparametric techniques for
estimating the unknown control function , we use a polynomial approximation.
We approximate the function (p^ij ; ^ij) by using a higher-order polynomial in
the propensity, p^ij , the residual, ^ij , and a cross-product term of the polynomials
of p^ij and ^ij . To determine the orders of the polynomials, we follow Das, Newey
and Vella (2003) by using the cross-validation (CV) procedure.9
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the wife's labor force participation
regression, which is used to obtain the residual, ^ij , for the control function.
Given that the regression is a reduced-form equation, we control for all the
individual and municipality characteristics that are assumed to be exogenous
in the municipality choice and fertility choice regressions. We also include a
quadratic term in si to accommodate potential nonlinearity between a wife's
working incentive and her husband's annual income.10 The estimated eects
9The CV results are available from the authors on request.
10We tried higher-order polynomial terms in si, but found that all the terms higher than
the second- order ones were statistically insignicant.
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of the household and municipality characteristics seem reasonable. One of the
cut-o dummy IVs, 1(si > 11:31), has the expected sign and is statistically
signicant.
Insert Table 3
Given the estimated propensity score and the residual from the wife's labor
force participation regression, we include the control function in the fertility
regression. The estimation results are reported in Table 4.11 The rst two
columns report the benchmark results without self-selection controls. Column 1
reports the OLS estimates and column 2 shows the IV estimates, which take
account of the endogeneity of the wife's labor force participation.12 The last
two columns show the estimation results with self-selection controls. In these
specications, because the \double-indexed" control function, (p^ij ; ^ij), is in-
cluded, both the self-selected migration of households and the endogeneity of
working wives are dealt with.13 Column 3 reports the estimation results for
the specication that minimized the CV criteria: the specication comprises
cubic terms for both propensity, p^ij , and the residual, ^ij , and an interaction
term of a linear propensity and residual. Column 4 reports the estimation re-
sults for the \undersmooth" specication of the minimized CV model. Because
nonparametric theory requires one to \undersmooth" the model by including
suciently higher-order polynomial terms in the control function, we use the
model reported in column 4 as our preferred specication for the self-selection-
corrected fertility regression model.
Insert Table 4
It is clear from columns 3 and 4 that some of the coecients in the control
function are statistically signicant from zero. The null hypothesis that all the
coecients of the control function are jointly insignicant is rejected at below
the one percent signicance level by a Wald test.14 These results conrm that
households' self-selection plays an important role in their fertility decisions.
In relation to the impacts of municipality-sponsored pronatal policies on
fertility, not all estimated coecients are statistically signicant, even after
11Following previous studies, we trim 2:5 percent of the data based on the values of the
propensity, p^ij , and the residual, ^ij , from each tail.
12The IV estimator is often termed a control function estimator because the inclusion of the
residual controls for the endogeneity of the regressor. It is shown by (see, e.g., Wooldridge,
2010) that the estimate is numerically identical to an ordinary two-stage least-squares esti-
mate.
13Given that we include the predicted component rather than the actual component, the
naive standard errors must be corrected to take account of sampling errors. We therefore use
a bootstrap procedure with 3; 000 replications to correct for the extra sampling variability
arising from imputing the predicted values of p^ij and ^ij . The statistical signicance of the
estimates is based on bootstrap t condence intervals.
14The Wald test statistics are 98:65 and 109:67 for the specications reported in columns 3
and 4, respectively, which are asymptotically distributed as 2 with 9 and 11 degrees of
freedom, respectively.
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controlling for self-selected migration. Moreover, policy impacts are quite het-
erogeneous across subgroups of households. The estimated coecients of the
interaction terms between pronatal policy and household characteristics show
that Community-based Support and Health Checkup Services aect the proba-
bility of childbirth for dierent types of households dierently. In particular,
Community-based Support policy has a greater positive impact on fertility, re-
gardless of birth parity, in households with low-income husbands than it does in
households with high-income husbands. By contrast, Health Checkup Services
policy is relatively more eective at increasing the probability of rst births for
households without preexisting children than it is at raising the probability of
households with a preexisting child having more children.
To get a sense of the impacts of fertility policies, we compute the marginal
eects for various subgroups of households that are categorized based on the hus-
band's annual income and whether they already had any children. Table 5 shows
the results. Figures represent percentage changes in the estimated probability of
childbirth induced by 10 percent increases in pronatal policy expenditure. The
specication used is the undersmoothed self-selection control model presented
in column 4 of Table 4. As shown, the policy impacts exhibit complex patterns,
with magnitudes depending on husband income and birth parity. The gures
reveal that Community-based Support policy has signicantly positive eects on
the probabilities of having second or later children for metropolitan households
with husbands whose annual income is below three million yen. We nd that
Health Checkup Services policy has a signicantly positive impact on the prob-
ability of having a rst child for metropolitan households in which husbands'
annual earnings exceed four million yen. Interestingly, no other pronatal policy
has a signicant impact on fertility. We also nd that, although Community-
based Support and Health Checkup Services policies have signicantly positive
impacts on fertility, the magnitudes are small. Our estimates suggest that a 10
percent increase in Community-based Support policy results in an increase in
the probability of having a rst child of between 0:1 and 0:3 percent. Similarly,
a 10 percent increase in Health Checkup Services policy raises the probability of
having additional children by between 0:5 and 0:9 percent.
Insert Table 5
It is important to quantify the size of the bias in the estimated eects of
policy on fertility when households' self-selected migrations are not considered.
For clarity, Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the marginal ef-
fects of policies on fertility and compares them across the OLS, IV, and the
undersmoothed self-selection control models, which correspond to the estima-
tion results reported in columns 1, 2, and 4 of Table 4, respectively. The top
gure shows the marginal eects of Community-based Support policy on the
probability of a household having a rst child, whereas the bottom gure shows
the marginal eects of Health Checkup Services policy on the probability of
households having additional (to the rst) children. The marginal eects are
evaluated for household groups with dierent levels of husband income.
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The gure reveals that policy impacts exhibit dierent patterns, depending
on which model is used for estimation. Overall, with few exceptions, the OLS
and IV models, which do not correct for self-selection, overestimate the marginal
eects in comparison to the model that does make this correction. In principle,
the self-selection biases could go in either direction. A possible explanation for
the upward bias in our estimates is that there is a correlation between pronatal
policies and researcher-unobserved preferences in the fertility regression's error
term for self-selected households. This may arise because households with a
strong desire to have children are more likely to self-select into municipalities
that oer generous pronatal policies. Thus, we conclude that households' self-
selection decisions across municipalities play an important role in estimating
the eects of pronatal policies. Ignoring self-selection in migration decisions can
induce substantial bias in the estimated eects of policy on fertility.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated the impacts of various municipality-sponsored prona-
tal policies on fertility in Japan. We were motivated by two questions: how do
the self-selected migration decisions of households aect the estimated eects
of pronatal policies on fertility, and which pronatal policies are more eective
for which types of households? To answer these questions, we developed an
empirical model that simultaneously accommodates households' migration and
fertility decisions, and estimated the structural parameters of the model using
microdata on Japanese households from metropolitan areas, after controlling
for self-selected migration decisions. Substantial variation in pronatal policies
across municipalities in Japan was used to identify the policy eects empirically.
Our main conclusion is that the self-selection decisions of households may
generate substantial upward bias in the estimated impacts of policy on fertility.
We also found that, even after controlling for self-selection, some noncash ben-
et pronatal policies signicantly increase the probability of households having
children, with the strength of these eects depending on household incomes and
birth parity.
17
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-06
References
Akabayashi, Hideo. 2006. \The Labor Supply of Married Women and Spousal
Tax Deduction in Japan- A Structural Estimation." Review of Economics of
the Household, 4(4): 349{378.
Andersson, Gunnar, Ann-Zoe Duvander, and Karsten Hank. 2004.
\Do Child Care Characteristics Inuence Continued Childbearing in Sweden?
An Investigation of the Quantity, Quality, and Price Discrimination." Journal
of European Social Policy, 14(4): 407{418.
Azmat, Ghazala, and Libertad Gonzalez. 2010. \Targeting Fertility
and Female Participation through the Income Tax." Labour Economics,
17(3): 487{502.
Bayer, Patrick, Robert MacMillan, and Kim Rueben. 2005. \An Equi-
librium Model of Sorting in an Urban Housing Market." NBER Working
Paper No. 10865.
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. 1995. \Automobile
Prices in Market Equilibrium." Econometrica, 63(4): 841{90.
Blau, David M., and Phillip K. Robins. 1989. \Fertility, Employment, and
Child-Care Costs." Demography, 26(2): 287{299.
Brewer, Mike, Anita Ratclie, and Sarah Smith. 2011. \Does welfare
reform aect fertility? Evidence from the UK." Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, 25(1): 245{266.
Cohen, Alma, Rajeev Dehejia, and Dmitri Romanov. 2007. \Do Finan-
cial Incentives Aect Fertility." NBER Working Paper No. 13700.
Dahl, Gordon. 2002. \Mobility and the Return to Education: Testing a Roy
Model with Multiple Marketsa." Econometrica, 70(6): 2367{2420.
Das, Mitali, Whitney Newey, and Francis Vella. 2003. \Nonparamet-
ric Estimation of Sample Selection Models." Review of Economic Studies,
70(1): 33{58.
Del Boca, Daniela. 2002. \The Eects of Child Care and Part Time Opportu-
nities on Participation and Fertility Decisions in Italy." IZA Discussion Paper
No. 427.
Ferreira, Fernando. 2010. \You Can Take It with You: Proposition 13 Tax
Benets, Residential Mobility, and Willingness to Pay for Housing Ameni-
ties." Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10): 661{673.
Gauthier, Anne H. 2007. \The Impact of Family Policies on Fertility in In-
dustrialized Countries: A Review of the Literature." Population Research and
Policy Review, 26(3): 323{346.
18
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-06
Gonzalez, Libertad. 2011. \The Eects of a Universal Child Benet." mimeo,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Lalive, Rafael, and Josef Zweimuller. 2009. \How does Parental Leave Af-
fect Fertility and Return to Work? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3): 1363{1402.
Laroque, Guy, and Bernard Salanie. 2008. \Does Fertility Respond to
Financial Incentives." IZA Discussion Paper No. 3575.
Milligan, Kevin. 2005. \Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on Tax Incen-
tives and Fertility." Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(3): 539{555.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2007. \Can
Policies Boost Birth Rates?" Policy Briefs, November.
Petrin, Amil, and Kenneth Train. 2010. \A Control Function Approach
to Endogeneity in Consumer Choice Model." Journal of Marketing Research,
47(1): 3{13.
Ronsen, Marit. 2004. \Fertility and Public Policies - Evidence from Norway
and Finland." Demographic Research, 10(6): 143{170.
Roy, A. D. 1951. \Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings." Oxford
Economic Papers, 3(2): 135{146.
Wooldridge, Jerey M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and
Panel Data. . 2nd ed., The MIT Press.
19
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-06
Appendix
Data appendix for municipality characteristics
(1) Tokyo Metropolitan Dummy: unity if a municipality is one of the 23 special
wards of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
(2) Major City Dummy: unity if a municipality is one of the 10 government-
ordinance-designated cities, as of 2004.
(3) Crime Rate: the number of reported crime cases per head of population.
Source: Criminal Statistics, National Police Agency.
(4) Unemployment Rate: the number of unemployed people as a proportion
of the labor force. Source: Annual Report on the Labor Force Survey,
Statistical Survey Department, Ministry of Internal Aairs and Commu-
nications.
(5) Rented Housing Proportion: the ratio of the number of rented houses to all
houses. Source: Housing and Land Survey, Statistical Survey Department,
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
(6) Financial Soundness Index: the ratio of standard nancial revenues to stan-
dard nancial needs. Source: Annual Statistical Report on Local Finance,
Local Public Finance Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communi-
cations.
(7) Supermarket Stores per Capita: the number of supermarket stores per head
of population. Source: Establishment and Enterprise Census, Statistical
Survey Department, Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
(8) Doctors per Capita: the number of medical doctors per head of popula-
tion. Source: Survey of Doctors, Dentists, Pharmacists, Statistics and
Information Department, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.
(9) College Graduates per Capita: the number of college graduates per head of
population. Source: Population Census, Statistical Survey Department,
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
(10) Residential Land Price: the average land price of one square meter of
residential land (in 10; 000 yen). Source: Land Price Survey by Prefectures,
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism.
Insert Table A.1
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Statistics for Household Characteristics and Pronatal Policies
Panel A: Sample Statistics for Household Characteristics
Sample Size Mean S.D. Min Max
Child Dummy (Dependent Variable) 5697 0.172 0.378 0.000 1.000
Wife's Age 5697 39.149 6.088 21.000 49.000
Husband's Age 5697 41.961 7.204 20.000 67.000
Husband's Annual Income 5697 6.399 2.661 0.050 35.370
Preexisting First Child Dummy 5697 0.239 0.426 0.000 1.000
Preexisting Second Child Dummy 5697 0.436 0.496 0.000 1.000
Preexisting Third Child Dummy 5697 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000
Wife Labor Dummy 5697 0.463 0.499 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Sample Statistics for Pronatal Policies b)
Sample Size Mean S.D. Min Max
Child Allowance 277 0.091 0.612 0.000 7.448
Medical Subsidy 277 1.093 0.981 0.000 13.473
Health Checkup Services 277 0.271 0.271 0.000 2.649
Daycare Services Expenses 277 9.736 6.674 0.000 32.462
Community-based Support 277 0.101 0.333 0.000 5.350
Panel C: Correlation for Pronatal Policies
Child Medical Health Daycare Community
Allowance Subsidy Checkups Services Support
Child Allowance 1.000
Medical Subsidy 0.434 1.000
Health Checkup Services -0.004 0.093 1.000
Daycare Services Expenses 0.085 0.108 0.025 1.000
Community-based Support -0.020 0.031 0.054 -0.034 1.000
Notes:
a) measured in million yen
b) measured in 10 thousand yen per child
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Table 2: Estimation Results: Location Choice Regression
Without Hedonic With Hedonic
Residual (1) Residual (2)
Municipal Characteristics:
Tokyo Metropolitan Dummy -0.3745 *** -1.476 ***
(0.1272) (0.4227)
Major City Dummy 1.797 *** 1.8502 ***
(0.0493) (0.0512)
Crime Rate -6.532 ** -12.3455 ***
(3.3165) (3.8359)
Unemployment Rate -12.9384 *** -15.1219 ***
(1.6948) (1.7545)
Rented Housing Proportion 2.7143 *** 2.3863 ***
(0.2360) (0.2884)
Financial Index 0.4049 *** 0.1300
(0.0936) (0.1306)
Supermarkets per Capita 0.4627 * -0.3754
(0.2812) (0.3896)
Doctors per Capita 7.1860 -0.1311
(9.6869) (10.2904)
College Grads per Capita -0.5515 -4.7373 ***
(0.5085) (1.4905)
Residential Land Price -0.0298 *** 0.0152
(0.0039) (0.0163)
Hedonic Residual
^ -0.0532 ***
(0.0168)
^2 -0.0033 ***
(0.0007)
^3 0.0001 ***
(0.0000)
Pronatal Policies Levels:
Child Allowance 0.0553 0.0324
(0.0805) (0.0818)
Medical Subsidy -0.1055 -0.0961
(0.0670) (0.0669)
Health Checkup Services 0.2901 * 0.2875 *
(0.1707) (0.1731)
Daycare Services Expenses 0.0068 0.0026
(0.0080) (0.0081)
Community-based Support -0.6976 -0.6916
(0.4495) (0.4413)
Pronatal Policies with Hus. Income:
Child Allowance 0.0026 0.0021
(0.0098) (0.0099)
Medical Subsidy -0.0055 -0.0059
(0.0082) (0.0082)
Health Checkup Services -0.0097 -0.0116
(0.0210) (0.0212)
Daycare Services Expenses 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Community-based Support -0.0524 -0.0485
(0.0378) (0.0369)
Pronatal Policies with Preexisting Child:
Child Allowance 0.0223 0.0230
(0.0698) (0.0706)
Medical Subsidy -0.0361 -0.0324
(0.0547) (0.0546)
Health Checkup Services -0.1720 -0.1697
(0.1352) (0.1364)
Daycare Services Expenses -0.0022 -0.0021
(0.0065) (0.0065)
Community-based Support 0.8306 ** 0.7774 *
(0.4079) (0.4009)
Sample Size 172012 172012
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** denotes statistically signicant at 1% level
** denotes statistically signicant at 5% level
* denotes statistically signicant at 10% level
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Table 3: Estimation Results: Wife's Labor Force Participation Regression
Household Characteristics:
Wife's Age 0.0162 ***
(0.0020)
Husband's Age 0.0042 **
(0.0017)
Husband's Annual Income -0.0484 ***
(0.0202)
Husband Annual Income2 0.0026
(0.0018)
Husband Annual Income3 -0.0000
(0.0000)
Preexisting 1st Child -0.0726
(0.0463)
Preexxisting 2nd Child 0.0099
(0.0457)
Preexisting 3rd Child 0.0382
(0.0479)
1(si > 4:83) -0.0113
(0.0240)
1(si > 11:31) -0.0876 *
(0.0507)
Pronatal Policies Levels:
Child Allowance -0.0332
(0.0481)
Medical Subsidy 0.0034
(0.0338)
Health Checkup Services 0.1539 *
(0.0924)
Daycare Services Expenses 0.0059
(0.0040)
Community-based Support -0.3706 *
(0.2035)
Pronatal Policies with Hus. Income:
Child Allowance 0.0056
(0.0063)
Medical Subsidy -0.0071 *
(0.0039)
Health Checkup Services -0.0182
(0.0114)
Daycare Services Expenses -0.0003
(0.0005)
Community-based Support 0.0202
(0.0141)
Pronatal Policies with Preexisting Child:
Child Allowance -0.0151
(0.0290)
Medical Subsidy 0.0384
(0.0275)
Health Checkup Services 0.0013
(0.0729)
Daycare Services Expenses -0.0048
(0.0032)
Community-based Support 0.2403
(0.1891)
Constant 0.1015
(0.1535)
Sample Size 5697
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Estimates of municipal characteristics are shown in Appendix.
*** denotes statistically signicant at 1% level
** denotes statistically signicant at 5% level
* denotes statistically signicant at 10% level
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Table 4: Estimation Results: Fertility Regression
OLS IV Self-Selection
Controlled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Characteristics:
Wife's Age -0.0148 *** -0.0169 *** -0.0155 *** -0.0151 ***
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Husband's Age -0.0071 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0082 *** -0.0081 ***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Husband's Annual Income -0.0010 0.0010 0.0025 0.0018
(0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0047)
Preexisting 1st Child -0.0479 -0.0377 -0.0509 -0.0575
(0.0391) (0.0423) (0.0412) (0.0412)
Preexisting 2nd Child -0.2312 *** -0.2314 *** -0.2235 *** -0.2274 ***
(0.0374) (0.0391) (0.0375) (0.0374)
Preexisting 3rd Child -0.2319 *** -0.2363 *** -0.2320 *** -0.2360 ***
(0.0377) (0.0397) (0.0382) (0.0381)
Wife Working Dummy -0.1134 *** 0.0192 -0.1455 -0.2558
(0.0083) (0.1474) (0.1729) (0.1831)
Pronatal Policies Levels:
Child Allowance 0.0451 0.0491 0.0422 0.0412
(0.0380) (0.0383) (0.0397) (0.0412)
Medical Subsidy -0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0018
(0.0261) (0.0273) (0.0266) (0.0267)
Health Checkup Services 0.1021 0.0774 0.1195 0.1124
(0.0725) (0.0797) (0.0811) (0.0812)
Daycare Services Expenses -0.0036 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0046
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Community-based Support 0.2499 0.3012 0.2119 0.1891
(0.1684) (0.1854) (0.1742) (0.1738)
Pronatal Policies with Hus. Income:
Child Allowance -0.0071 * -0.0078 * -0.0062 -0.0061
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0045)
Medical Subsidy -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0018
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Health Checkup Services 0.0025 0.0057 0.0023 0.0019
(0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0089)
Daycare Services Expenses 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Community-based Support -0.0171 ** -0.0202 ** -0.0161 * -0.0137
(0.0077) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0086)
Pronatal Policies with Preexisting Child:
Child Allowance -0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0099 -0.0094
(0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0244) (0.0251)
Medical Subsidy 0.0037 -0.0014 0.0075 0.0103
(0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0240) (0.0241)
Health Checkup Services -0.1017 -0.1020 -0.1145 * -0.1105 *
(0.0628) (0.0653) (0.0643) (0.0646)
Daycare Services Expenses 0.0038 0.0044 0.0036 0.0035
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Community-based Support -0.1382 -0.1703 -0.1154 -0.1050
(0.1613) (0.1732) (0.1611) (0.1607)
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Estimation Results: Fertility Regression (Continued)
Municipal Characteristics:
Tokyo Metropolitan Dummy 0.0066 -0.0076 -0.0213 -0.0007
(0.0304) (0.0355) (0.0384) (0.0395)
Major City Dummy 0.0061 0.0053 -0.0096 -0.0109
(0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Crime Rate -0.2651 -0.1495 -0.5640 -0.5862
(0.9119) (0.9623) (0.9712) (0.9714)
Unemployment Rate -0.1249 0.0902 0.2253 0.1367
(0.3928) (0.4762) (0.4919) (0.4925)
Rented Housing Proportion 0.0321 0.0265 0.0813 0.0938
(0.0683) (0.0717) (0.0734) (0.0732)
Financial Soundness Index 0.0240 0.0228 0.0235 0.0152
(0.0273) (0.0285) (0.0303) (0.0305)
Supermarkets per Capita -0.0178 -0.0303 -0.0258 -0.0387
(0.1014) (0.1037) (0.1118) (0.1135)
Doctors per Capita -3.0914 -2.0605 -4.0644 -5.1466
(4.0493) (4.3226) (4.5193) (4.6016)
College Grads per Capita -0.2008 -0.0750 -0.1792 -0.1836
(0.1282) (0.1930) (0.2065) (0.2073)
Control Functions:
Residual -0.1331 0.1966 0.4368
(0.1476) (0.1940) (0.2591)
Residual2 -1.0593 *** -1.0127 ***
(0.1604) (0.1548)
Residual3 -0.5169 *** -1.2849 *
(0.1617) (0.6809)
Residual4 1.4307 *** 1.3290 ***
(0.2904) (0.2733)
Residual5 -0.8 0.9437
0.54 (0.8034)
Propensity 7.4184 * 1.0395
(4.1305) (1.0234)
Propensity2 -20.25 * -18.3437
10.57 (12.7833)
Propensity3 16.4722 * 110.2711 *
(8.5780) (62.4750)
Propensity4 0.0546 -244.9775 *
(0.0848) (124.1199)
Propensity5 177.7303 **
(84.4808)
Residual Propensity 0.0575
(0.0850)
Constant 1.2611 *** 1.2615 *** 1.4670 *** 1.4932 ***
(0.0635) (0.0661) (0.0762) (0.0852)
Sample Size 5587 5587 5587 5587
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** denotes statistically signicant at 1% level
** denotes statistically signicant at 5% level
* denotes statistically signicant at 10% level
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Table 5: Eects of Pronatal Policies on Fertility (10 Percent Increases): Esti-
mates are Based on Model with Self-selection Correction
Husband Annual Revenue (in million yen)
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Households w/ Child or Children
Child Allowance 0.103 0.088 0.041 0.021 0.008 -0.006 -0.024 -0.052 -0.082 -0.124
Medical Subsidy 0.376 0.306 0.133 0.058 0.003 -0.058 -0.132 -0.258 -0.386 -0.566
Health Checkup Services 0.043 0.077 0.070 0.074 0.093 0.119 0.148 0.216 0.270 0.346
Daycare Services Expenses -0.459 -0.401 -0.196 -0.113 -0.062 -0.008 0.059 0.161 0.275 0.435
Community-based Support 0.294* 0.262* 0.132* 0.080 0.050 0.020 -0.019 -0.075 -0.139 -0.231
Households w/o Child or Children
Child Allowance 0.050 0.042 0.032 0.021 0.016 0.009 0.001 -0.008 -0.019 -0.031
Medical Subsidy -0.061 -0.094 -0.116 -0.128 -0.169 -0.200 -0.254 -0.317 -0.410 -0.470
Health Checkup Services 0.597 0.608 0.577 0.501* 0.560* 0.570* 0.637** 0.712** 0.841* 0.878*
Daycare Services Expenses -0.823 -0.794 -0.715 -0.584 -0.615 -0.588 -0.613 -0.640 -0.706 -0.678
Community-based Support 0.258 0.240 0.208 0.161 0.161 0.145 0.139 0.132 0.130 0.106
Notes: All eects are measured in percentage increase of childbearing probability.
*denotes statistically signicant at 10% level
**denotes statistically signicant at 5% level
26
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-06
Table A.1: Sample Statistics for Municipality Characteristics
Sample Size Mean S.D. Min Max
Tokyo Metropolitan Dummy 5697 0.035 0.185 0.000 1.000
Major City Dummy 5697 0.193 0.394 0.000 1.000
Crime Rate 5697 0.024 0.007 0.010 0.053
Unemployment Rate 5697 0.061 0.015 0.030 0.194
Rented Housing Proportion 5697 0.335 0.091 0.042 0.518
Financial Soundness Index 5697 0.876 0.224 0.200 1.780
Supermarkets per Capita 5697 0.142 0.052 0.000 1.057
Doctors per Capita 5697 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.015
College Graduates per Capita 5697 0.138 0.042 0.030 0.288
Residential Land Price 637 9.751 9.469 0.510 92.630
Table A.2: Estimates of Municipality Characteristics: Wife's Labor Force Par-
ticipation Regression
Municipal Characteristics:
Tokyo Metropolitan Dummy 0.1510
(0.1900)
Major City Dummy 0.0116
(0.0213)
Crime Rate -1.1627
(1.6703)
Unemployment Rate -1.635 ***
(0.6302)
Rented Housing Proportion 0.0851
(0.1307)
Financial Soundness Index 0.0158
(0.0546)
Supermarkets per Capita 0.0781
(0.1943)
Doctors per Capita -7.5045
(6.5314)
College Grads per Capita -0.8041
(0.6984)
Residential Land Price -0.0017
(0.0076)
Hedonic Residual
^ -0.0015
(0.0077)
^2 -0.0007 **
(0.0003)
^3 0 **
(0.0000)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** denotes statistically signicant at 1% level
** denotes statistically signicant at 5% level
* denotes statistically signicant at 10% level
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Figure 1: Trends in Total Fertility Rates in Selected OECD Countries
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Figure 2: Variation Maps of Pronatal Policies for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
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Figure 3: Dierence in Annual Tax Deduction between a Household in which a
Wife's Gross Annual Income is Below the Spousal Deduction Eligibility Thresh-
old and a Household in which the Wife's Gross Annual Income is Above the
Threshold (10,000 yen)
30
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-06
!"! # $ % & ' ( ) *
!
+#,&
+#
+!,&
+!
+",&
"
",&
-./01234/5678//5122.195:2;8<=5><:99:825?=2@
A=9B+/=9=;C:825D877=;C=3
EFA
GH
(a) Community-based Support
!"! # $ % & ' ( ) *
!+%
,,,
"
"+#
"+%
"+'
"+)
!
!+#
-./01234/,567//,122.18,92:7;<,=;988972,><2?
@<8AB/<8<:C972,D766<:C<3
EF@
GH
(b) Health Checkup Services
Figure 4: Comparison of the Estimated Pronatal Eects of Policy on Fertility
between Specications: OLS, IV, and Self-selection Controlled Model. (Figures
represent percentage increases in fertility probability when the corresponding
policy expenditure is increased by 10 percent.)
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